The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 33
Number 3 Parameters Autumn 2003

Article 1

8-1-2003

In Search of Monsters to Destroy: American Empire in the New
Millennium
Juan A. Alsace

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters

Recommended Citation
Juan A. Alsace, "In Search of Monsters to Destroy: American Empire in the New Millennium," Parameters
33, no. 3 (2003), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.2154.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

In Search of Monsters to
Destroy: American Empire
in the New Millennium
JUAN A. ALSACE
© 2003 Juan A. Alsace

“We have had an Imperial lesson; it may make us an Empire yet!”
1
— Rudyard Kipling

W

ith the coldly calculated use of terror, the perpetrators of 11 September
2001 served abrupt notice of challenge to US global dominance. The
seemingly easy path before Americans that had appeared to stretch out well into
the 21st century—promising boundless economic growth, a worldwide embrace
of US values, an absence of rivals—stood blocked by the rubble in New York and
Washington. In tallying the costs buried within the debris of 9/11, Americans
need to look beyond the lost lives and shattered dreams and recognize that defense of the empire they possess will not come cheaply. But first they must accept
the fact of empire. Those who argue the United States has no empire to uphold
whistle past the graveyard, ignoring the historically unparalleled confluence of
political, economic, military, and information power that have come together in
the American imperial construct. To a great extent, the United States holds sway
over the world—or at least influence over much of it—an empire inviting admiration, envy, and, as with all empires before it, challenge.
John Quincy Adams warned in 1821 that Americans should resist the
temptation of going abroad “in search of monsters to destroy.”2 But in September
2001, monsters literally came to the United States, threatening political instability, economic malaise, and chaos. Even with al Qaeda on the run and Baghdad
now fallen, the world remains dangerous and unstable, with vital US interests
challenged by committed actors and unrelenting forces. North Korea pursues its
nuclear ambition; Israelis and Palestinians remain locked in a death embrace; Islamic fundamentalists scheme to force the world back to the seventh century; Colombia teeters at the edge of failure; and the whole of the African continent stares
122

Parameters

at virtual extinction occasioned by a plague of Biblical proportion. Only the
United States has the capability to restore order, imposing its will when and
where necessary. This imperial path holds danger and difficulty, but it is a choice
the nation must embrace, even if reluctantly and at certain cost.

Taking up the Gauntlet
In September 2002, the Bush Administration released its carefully
crafted National Security Strategy (NSS), affirmatively answering the question of
whether the United States would meet the challenges posed by a disordered world,
seemingly accepting the mantle and responsibility of empire. The Administration
determined, not unreasonably, that the doctrines of containment and deterrence
that had served the nation throughout the Cold War would not be effective in protecting Americans against asymmetric threats posed by irrational or ideologically
motivated non-state actors or rogue states, foes who would be neither contained
nor deterred.3 The new “Bush Doctrine” of preemption, as enunciated in the NSS,
drew attention (and criticism) as proof that the United States would act unilaterally—indeed, with imperial “arrogance”—in defense of its interests.
If truth be told, preemption is not so radical a concept; at heart it is simply self-defense. Controversy lies, however, in the robust version of self-defense
espoused in the NSS. Therein preemption has moved from the classic, internationally recognized “anticipatory self-defense” in the face of imminent danger to
a flat assertion that the United States can even change regimes in order to obviate
dangers not yet operational, as exemplified by the war against Iraq.4
But even “more ambitious than preemption is the sometimes overlooked
assertion that the United States will remain powerful enough to keep potential adversaries from a military buildup that would surpass or equal the power of the
United States.”5 Herein truly lies assertion of imperial prerogative: the United
States will “have all the power and no one else shall have the capacity to provide a
balance. . . . [It is a] declaration of absolute military supremacy throughout the
globe.”6 Max Boot, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, observes
that this “predominance doctrine” reflects the American preference to go it alone,
unconstrained by allies.7 Many in the world—the French come to mind—view the
combination of preemption and predominance as insidious, an imperial overreach
that goes beyond a war on terror to establish the United States not only as the
world’s constable but as its final arbiter of state legitimacy.8
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“This imperial path holds danger and difficulty,
but it is a choice the nation must embrace,
even if reluctantly and at certain cost.”

The National Security Strategy seeks to soften such opposition with repeated assertions that the United States acts only with the most benevolent of motives: to “create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in
which all nations and societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic freedom.”9 Such pieties are very likely neither
convincing nor comforting to European or Chinese practitioners of realpolitik
(nor to al Qaeda, for that matter), given the insistence in the NSS that the American vision of democratic governance and economic policy is the “single sustainable model for national success.”10 But they do serve to make empire palatable to
a US populace that has “tended to reject the idea that our own high-minded republic might be imperial (much less imperialist) . . . [certain that Washington] did not
seek to conquer territory nor, supposedly, to dominate other societies.”11
It may be true that American dominion lacks many of the indicia of classic empire—the United States does not, for example, forcibly extract resources
from colonies, impose its political values and institutions by force, or direct the
foreign policies of client states.12 While the operation in Iraq lends pause to the
claim that the United States will not impose its values, as a general proposition
America exercises its authority indirectly, preferring “seduction to coercion” (albeit perfectly prepared to use force as necessary), always with the goal of maintaining supremacy. As Andrew Bacevich notes, this preference “befits a nation
founded on the conviction of its own uniqueness, [an] empire . . . like no other in
history.”13 In sum, rigid academic classification should not deter “Americans
[from] admitting the truth and facing up to their responsibilities as the undisputed
masters of the world.”14
This American mastery comes in several forms. US economic might
drives the world’s trade and markets and American political power can often
shape the decisions of international bodies. In the 21st century, American “soft
power” surely influences the course of human events, creating an enticing culture driven by US command of the information network. But that attractive velvet glove hides a mailed fist, the nexus of American power. The United States
“has overwhelming superiority in military power, and uses that power to influence the internal behavior of other states, [acting as] an empire.”15 Televised images of American tanks rolling through the streets of Baghdad evinced the
“centrality of military power to present-day American policy . . . to convey disap124
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proval, change attitudes, and dictate behavior.”16 As one reviews current American military strategy and planning for the future, defense of empire, if not its
expansion, seems a clear if unspoken objective.

A Ruling Capability
In the Cold War years, US military planning was “threat-based,” focused
mainly on the specter of Soviet-bloc tanks racing through the Fulda Gap. With the
collapse of the Soviet threat—and the subsequent seeming absence of any real
threat at all—the military moved toward a “capabilities-based” posture, a shift in
focus consistent with the 2002 National Security Strategy.17 A “threat-based” force
was reactive and defensive in nature: the United States awaited the thrust. In contrast, a “capabilities-based” force carries with it an implication of offensive capability if not intent: the US focus is not on any particular threat as it prepares for any
and all contingencies by adopting an aggressive, forward-leaning posture.
In Joint Vision 2020, the US military posits “Full Spectrum Dominance,” a doctrine that moves beyond fighting and winning conventional wars,
past confronting weapons of mass destruction, to a particular attention to the
“asymmetric threats—terrorists, criminals, religious crazies, two-bit strongmen
with big ambitions, anarchy-minded hackers, and unscrupulous scientists peddling weapons secrets to make a buck.”18 This “capabilities-based” force provides policymakers with a suite of options to fight what Boot calls “the savage
wars of peace . . . necessary to enlarge the ‘empire of liberty.’”19
The US ability to bend wills derives from several key elements, but perhaps the most important is the ubiquity of its presence worldwide, with “military
bases, or base rights, in some 40 countries—giving it the same global muscle it
would enjoy if it ruled those countries directly.”20 The US footprint is innocuous
in most cases (often treaty rights without a physical presence, except as needed),
allowing for a light touch that minimizes local resentments. Next, the United
States projects power and imperial influence through its Special Forces and intelligence capabilities. Since 9/11, the United States has quietly dispersed such
forces worldwide, moving “deeply into the governments, intelligence agencies,
and security apparatus of many countries . . . [with] small numbers of US forces
‘advising’(i.e., commanding) native forces, . . . in effect usurping sovereignty.”21
The use of proxies is a time-honored tradition of empire: Bacevich devotes an entire chapter of his book American Empire to comparing US proxies
fighting, inter alia, in Afghanistan, to the British employing Gurkhas during the
time of the Raj. When Australian Prime Minister John Howard asserted his own
nation’s right to strike preemptively (following the 12 October 2002 terror attacks in Bali), his alarmed Asian neighbors accused him of playing America’s
“deputy sheriff” in Southeast Asia.22
A rapid response capability, intelligence/information dominance, proxies, and air and naval power are all evolving components of American imperial
power projection. That said, “lesson one in the Roman handbook for imperial
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success would be a realization that it is not enough to have great military
strength; the rest of the world must know that strength—and fear it.”23 The war on
terror, as the Administration has oft-noted, is being fought in the shadows, as it
should be. But the war against Iraq has been front-page news for nearly all of
2003, dominating the world’s consciousness, underscoring the reality of American suzerainty. The willingness on the part of the United States to use credible
and massive force against Saddam Hussein, as The Washington Post speculated
on 13 April 2003, did more than topple a dictator: it served notice in Pyongyang,
Tehran, and Damascus that Washington will remove those who threaten US interests.24 That action is truly an exercise of imperial power, a “demonstration that
the empire cannot be challenged with impunity.”25

Shocked and Awed . . . by the Check
The image of Saddam’s statue tumbling from its pedestal brings with it
a visceral satisfaction; the American psyche, scarred by 9/11, anthrax attacks,
color-coded security alerts, economic woes, and a general sense of unease, restored to a confident, imperial swagger. Watch out, world! But the victory comes
at a cost, and the bill has yet to be paid. As Boot noted in October 2002:
[As] impressive as the American military dominance of the past decade has been, it
was acquired, relatively speaking, on the cheap. America spends only about 3.5
percent of its GDP on defense, down from 4.4 percent as recently as 1993 . . . but
[now] there aren’t enough troops to carry out all our commitments, and the equipment they use is aging fast. . . . [N]ext year’s [2003] defense budget increase won’t
begin to cover this shortfall. . . . If America is serious about remaining the Big
Enchilida, it will have to spend more on defense.”26

The expense of bases abroad, of massive deployments, of “full spectrum
dominance,” is going to fall on the American taxpayer, with an economy still in the
doldrums. In spending for imperial defense, the United States may shortchange
domestic priorities for, as Michael Ignatieff observes, “What empires lavish
abroad, they cannot spend on good republican government at home: on hospitals or
roads or schools.”27 To the defense bill, add also the cost of homeland security and,
of course, the as-yet-uncalculated costs of Iraqi reconstruction.
The Romans, Ottomans, and British resolved this issue easily and brutally, through the imposition of imperial levies. The US approach, bowing to both
domestic and international sensibilities, is of necessity subtler, based on the principle of what Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad has characterized as “empire by
invitation.”28 A good example is the arrangement that the United States has with
Singapore, which agreed to pay for the construction of a naval facility that could
accommodate American carriers. Singaporeans have now both an economic and
security stake in the empire (not to mention plausible deniability, as they can claim
that the facilities are open to any nation, even if the United States is the only likely
occupant). While such direct subsidies are welcome, the costs of the imperial con126
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“The expense of bases abroad, of massive
deployments, of ‘full spectrum dominance,’ is
going to fall on the American taxpayer,
with an economy still in the doldrums.”

struct are in the last analysis defrayed on a grander scale, through globalization and
a stable, open economic order that furthers, first and foremost, American prosperity. This is the aim US power ultimately means to impose and protect.

Non, Nyet, Nein
In addition to the economic accounting, there is also an intangible levy,
best summed up by President Bush’s question in the aftermath of 9/11: “Why do
they hate us so?” He answered the question in a typically American manner that
underscores the sense of exceptionalism that informs US policy: “They hate our
freedoms.” Perhaps. But a more honest answer might be that “they” hate US power
and a system that “no matter how benevolent the intentions . . . will generate some
violence . . . [by] those left outside the expanding walls [of empire].”29 More to the
point, the weak have always envied the strong; it is a natural human reaction.
If foreign envy were the only concern of US policymakers, the wailings
of the French, Russians, or Germans would be as ephemeral whispers lost in the
rising American chorus. But these allied fulminations represent only the least
threatening manifestation of challenge to the American empire. There are potential great-power rivals. China is most often cited as the likeliest candidate. Several respected US research institutions have concluded, however, that, “China
[remains far] from the threshold of global military power . . . [and that] the formidable US lead over China in military technology may well expand in the 21st century.”30 Hobbled by a shrinking population and a bankrupt social infrastructure,
Russia’s bleak demographics leave it weak into the foreseeable future. The European Union, wired into the information age and potentially militarily capable,
could emerge as a peer competitor, assuming it achieves actual political integration. But EU nations share US democratic values and a commitment to open trade
and market systems. They grumble at US dominance, but they are unlikely to
truly undermine an order that has brought them prosperity as well.
The absence of great power rivals provides little comfort, however. In
their place, “a viper’s nest of perils . . . that run the gamut from terror and international organized crime to rogue states and genocidal violence fueled by ethnic
hatred” challenges the established order.31 Professor John Keegan recommends
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that, in response, “the great work of disarming tribes, sects, warlords, and criminals—a principal achievement of monarchs in the 17th century and empires in
the 19th” be revived today.32 Combating forces that have typically nibbled at the
edges of empire has heretofore “been trivialized as hovering somehow beneath
the dignity of serious strategists and military planners.”33 The physical scars of
9/11—as well as its lingering economic aftershocks—make clear that the United
States can no longer afford the luxury of that conceit.
Still and all, militarily engaging the Lilliputians might be the easiest element of a complex problem. Even in their most terrible forms, transnational terrorism, rogue states, and international crime are dwarfed by American power. The
counterstrikes the United States can expect from al Qaeda, the narco-traffickers,
and the disaffected will be as pinpricks in the flanks of empire. It is crucial that US
responses, while firm, be measured against other interests. The danger ultimately
lies not so much in what others do, but in what the United States does or does not.

Of this World and In It
Ironically, the United States, the nation of immigrants, “remains a profoundly provincial, monolingual nation . . . not [much] interested in the rest of the
world and certainly [not knowing] much about it.”34 Yet, as Bacevich argues,
“America’s purpose is the creation of an open and integrated international order
based on the principles of democratic capitalism, with the United States as the ultimate guarantor of order and enforcer of norms.”35 Can the United States restore
order and lead a world in which it has little interest and knowledge?
It is a critical question because the nature and ultimate success or failure
of the American empire depends on its answer. If Americans become a truly insular people, suspicious of the world and of its motives, the nation is likely to head
down unsavory paths, to an empire bereft of the values that give the United States
a legitimate claim to leadership. In the end, in that event, it will become an empire
that will have drifted from its bedrock moorings and it will fail. The better road
would have Americans undertake their responsibility to genuinely engage the
world they purport to lead, building relationships that will both facilitate the restoration of imperial order and soften the resentments that breed chaos. There is
no guarantee that such an empire will succeed—history has no precedent—but in
the effort Americans will have put behind them the rubble of 9/11, returning to
the path upon which they were embarked, while remaining true to themselves.
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